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ABSTRACT 
In Malaysia, victims of domestic violence including women may seek protection under the 
Domestic Violence Act 1994 (Act 521) (hereinafter “DVA 1994”). Pursuant to section 10 of 
the DVA 1994, female victims of domestic violence (hereinafter “FVDV”) have the right to 
claim compensation from their husbands or former husbands (hereinafter “Abusive 
Husbands”). The criminal court also has jurisdiction to make a compensation order as stated 
under section 426 (1A) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) (hereinafter “CPC”). A 
qualitative approach was used for this research, consisting of a detailed analysis of the DVA 
1994, CPC, Penal Code (Act 574), case laws, journals, newspapers and scholarly writings 
related to this area. Based on the findings, there are shortcomings within both provisions which 
may affect the FVDV’s claim for compensation. Thus, it is timely to propose amendments and 
reforms to enhance their rights. These include the insertion of a provision stressing that the 
claim for compensation under section 10 of the DVA 1994 can be applied through a stand-
alone application, the inclusion of a provision allowing the compensation order to be initiated 
by the court on its own motion or upon the application by the FVDV themselves, imposing a 
responsibility on the court to give reasons if the court decides to disallow the application for 
compensation made, explaining the legal consequence to the offender should the offender fail 
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to comply with the compensation order, and alternatively to consider a state-funded 
compensation scheme to provide immediate financial assistance to FVDV without going 
through the court process. 
 
Keywords: Abusive husbands, domestic violence, female victims of domestic violence 
(FVDV), right to compensation. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The issue of domestic violence against women is a global phenomenon that can be found in all 
sections of society regardless of race, religion and status (Devries et al., 2013). Domestic 
violence against women is a serious phenomenon because of its harmful effects, physically and 
mentally. Examples of physical injuries that are commonly reported include cuts, bruises, bite 
marks, broken bones, miscarriage, loss of hearing and vision, and permanent disability (Alejo, 
2014). In addition, domestic violence has a negative impact on the mental state of the victim. 
Depression, anxiety, disorders of personality, eating and sleeping disorders and suicide are 
some examples of how victims’ mental states are affected (Uzun & Uzunboylu, 2015). The 
DVA 1994 protects victims of domestic violence in Malaysia. Section 2 of the DVA 1994 
stipulates that women who are victimised in domestic violence by their Abusive Husbands as 
victims of domestic violence. What then is the definition of domestic violence? When the DVA 
1994 was first implemented, the definition of “domestic violence” as referred to in paragraphs 
(a) to (e) of section 2 was confined to “wilfully or knowingly placing, or attempting to place, 
the victim in fear of physical injury; causing physical injury to the victim by such act which is 
known or ought to have been known would result in physical injury; compelling the victim by 
force or threat to engage in any conduct or act, sexual or otherwise, from which the victim has 
a right to abstain; confining or detaining the victim against the victim's will; causing mischief 
or destruction or damage to property with intent to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause 
distress or annoyance to the victim.” The fact that this earlier interpretation of domestic 
violence did not take into consideration the fact that victims also suffer from psychological 
abuse from domestic violence was openly criticised. The definition of domestic violence was 
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therefore amended in 2012 by inserting three more paragraphs which are (f), (g) and (h) to 
expand the meaning of domestic violence to include “psychological abuse which includes 
emotional injury to the victim” The definition even included “causing the victim to suffer 
delusions by using intoxicating substance or any other substance without the victim’s consent, 
and if consent was given, it was deemed unlawfully obtained.” The interpretation of domestic 
violence under the DVA 1994 was again amended in 2017 by inserting three more paragraphs 
which are (ea), (eb) and (ec): “dishonestly misappropriating the victim’s property which causes 
the victim to suffer distress due to financial loss; threatening the victim with intent to cause the 
victim to fear for his safety or the safety of his property, to fear for the safety of a third person, 
or to suffer distress; communicating with the victim, communicating about the victim to a third 
person, with intent to insult the modesty of the victim through any means, electronic or 
otherwise.” Presently, the definition of domestic violence has in it a comprehensive list of 
harms which include physical, psychological, emotional, sexual, financial abuse and abuse of 
victim’s dignity. The paper focuses on FVDV as their numbers continue to grow (Nazli, 
Aspalella, Asmar, & Che Thalbi, 2016). It was reported by the former Deputy Minister of 
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, Datin Paduka Chew Mei Fun in 
the Dewan Negara on 26 April 2017 that around 23,212 cases of domestic against women were 
reported between 2010 and March 2017 (Chow, 2017). 
The rights of victims including women can be seen in Article 8(1) of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia. The Article states that “All persons are equal before the law and 
entitled to equal protection of the law.” Although the Federal Constitution does not expressly 
state the status of a victim, the word “persons” mentioned above may refer to any person, 
including the victim and the offender. Thus, by virtue of this Article, victims including women 
should also be guaranteed equal rights and protection before the law (Nasimah, 2011). This 
coincides with the stance of the United Nations that can be seen under paragraph 4 of the United 
Nations Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
(hereinafter “Declaration”) where it emphasizes that “Victims should be treated with 
compassion and respect for their dignity”. The recognition of rights of victims at an 
international level was first achieved through this Declaration. The Declaration was adopted 
by consensus by the United Nation General Assembly on 29 November 1985 through 
Resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985. Through the Declaration, it recommends measures to 
be taken by states to improve access to justice and fair treatment, restitution, compensation and 
assistance for victims. 
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The FVDV’s rights to obtain legal protection can be seen in the DVA 1994. Among the 
legal protections available to FVDV are protection orders, compensation and rehabilitation 
programme to improve the victim’s safety by ensuring greater access to justice and protection 
from domestic violence. In an effort to ensure the interests of FVDV are safeguarded 
financially, the law in Malaysia permits the court to make a compensation order to recompense 
the FVDV for injury or loss sustained as a result of domestic violence. The aim of the paper is 
to analyse the rights of FVDV to obtain compensation under section 10 of the DVA 1994 and 
section 426 (1A) of the CPC.  
 
2.0 METHODOLOGY 
This research is qualitative in nature with a pure legal approach. This research adopted a content 
analysis method which involved a detailed analysis of the DVA 1994, CPC, Penal Code and 
case laws as the primary sources. In addition to that, this research also analysed the journals, 
newspapers and scholarly writings related to this area to discuss the rights of FVDV to obtain 
compensation under section 10 of the DVA 1994 and section 426 (1A) of the CPC. The data 
collected from this research were critically analysed to identify the current legal position on 
the issue of rights to compensation of FVDV in Malaysia and proposes the necessary 
enhancement to the legal framework. 
 
3.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Compensation in Civil Proceeding 
FVDV who suffered injury or damage to property or financial loss as a result of domestic 
violence have, under section 10 of the DVA 1994, the right to claim for compensation from 
their Abusive Husbands in tort. This is explained in section 2 of the DVA 1994, which states 
that “in respect of civil proceedings for compensation under section 10, the court is competent 
to hear such claims in tort.” In general, the section does not explicitly state whether the 
application for compensation can be made through a stand-alone application or in addition to 
other civil actions, particularly through divorce applications under the Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976 (Act 164) (hereinafter “LRA 1976”). Based on the case law, the 
application is normally made by the FVDV in addition to application for dissolution of 
marriage. The rationale of making the application at this stage is because the FVDV do not 
wish to continue with the marriage as they can no longer tolerate and live with their spouses 
and therefore, may want to make various applications prior to the separation, such as 
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compensation for injury or loss sustained through domestic violence. This right, however, 
depends on the wish of the FVDV to enforcing the provision, despite the law already being in 
place. This provision must therefore be pleaded in court to claim compensation from the 
Abusive Husbands for injuries suffered as a result of domestic violence. 
An example in which the compensation had been pleaded by the FVDV can be seen in 
Sathia Vadivaloo v Megendran Vellasamy [2013] 1 LNS 429. In this case, the petitioner (wife) 
filed an application for divorce. In addition to the divorce application, the petitioner also 
applied for compensation amounting to RM10,000 for injuries suffered in consequence of 
domestic violence. Nevertheless, the court was of the view that there was no legal basis under 
the LRA 1976 for the court to allow the petitioner's claim for the respondent (husband) to pay 
RM10,000 in special and exemplary damages on domestic violence injuries. The court also 
highlighted that the petitioner’s lawyer failed to show the grounds for the application. For that 
reason, the petitioner's application was rejected. 
From the abovementioned case, it shows the need for the FVDV or their lawyers to 
know section 10 of the DVA 1994, to state (plead) the said section in the application for 
compensation and able to prove their case under the said section before the court. This would 
help the court to make the right decision. The question at this juncture is how is the application 
affected if section 10 of the DVA 1994 is not specifically stated by the FVDV?  Is the court 
able to use its discretion to decide on the application? To answer this question, reference can 
be made to Order 1A of the Rules of Court 2012 (hereinafter “RoC 2012”) which states: “In 
administering these Rules, the Court or a Judge shall have regard to the overriding 
interest of justice and not only to the technical non-compliance with these Rules.” This 
provision indicates that the RoC 2012 allows the court to hear the case on its merits to attain 
justice and should not be dismissed because of non-compliance with the rules. This principle 
was affirmed by the court in Redang Paradise Vacation Sdn Bhd v Yap Chuan Bin & Other 
Appeals [2017] 10 CLJ 296. 
Order 7 Rule 2 (1A) of the RoC 2012 states that “Every originating summons shall state 
in its intitulement any provision of these Rules and any provision of any written law under 
which the Court is being moved.” The words “any provision of any written law” means the 
FVDV must state the law under which the application is based. Hence, if FVDV wish to apply 
for compensation from their Abusive Husbands, then section 10 of the DVA 1994 must be 
stated in the intitulement to ensure the court is notified of the law under which it is being 
moved. A reading of this provision shows that if the FVDV fails to comply with Order 7 Rule 
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2 (1A) of the RoC 2012 to state the law (which is section 10 of the DVA 1994) under which 
the court is being moved will not result in immediate dismissal, but may be cured under Order 
1A of the RoC 2012. This is known as curable principle in law. Nevertheless, as a matter of 
caution, it is advisable for the FVDV to state section 10 of the DVA 1994 in the intitulement 
to avoid any undesirable outcome. 
In a case reported by the Star Online dated 13 September 2015, the Kuala Lumpur High 
Court Judge, Justice Noraini Abdul Rahman had granted the application of a wife to obtain 
compensation from her husband (Koshy, 2015). It had been described as “the first time here, a 
judge gave compensation for injuries caused by domestic violence.” The case referred to was 
the case of Chin Yoke Yin v Tan Theam Huat [2015] 11 MLJ 577. In this case, the petitioner 
(wife) had applied for compensation in addition to the application for dissolution of marriage. 
The court was satisfied that it had the jurisdiction to hear and decide on the application as it 
falls within the civil jurisdiction of a High Court since the “intitulement of the suit mentioned 
‘Dalam perkara Seksyen-Seksyen 2 dan 10 Akta Keganasan Rumah Tangga 1994’ (p. 557)”. 
The court then held that in addition to dissolving the marriage, the court also ordered the 
respondent (husband) to pay compensation to his wife amounting to RM4,000 for the injuries 
caused. In granting the compensation, the court had relied on the evidence testified by two 
doctors and a medical report. This case shows that such evidence is crucial for the court to 
allow the application for compensation under section 10 of the DVA 1994. 
It can be inferred that the application for compensation can be made through civil 
action. Looking at both cases, the application was pleaded in addition to the divorce 
application. However, it is important to note that the application for compensation can also be 
made through a stand-alone application because of the general wording of section 10 of the 
DVA 1994 itself. Notwithstanding the existence of Order 1A of the RoC 2012, in order to 
ensure that the application for compensation is successful and not rejected due to technical 
issues, it is advisable for the FVDV to state section 10 of the DVA 1994 in the intitulement to 
avoid any undesirable outcome. Moreover, in order to support the application for compensation 
in court, the FVDV should ensure they get medical treatment and are able to provide medical 
proof for the injuries suffered in court. If they fail, it can affect the chance of the FVDV to 
claim compensation from the Abusive Husbands. This was evident in Loo Pang Kee v Anna 
Jacqueline Ching Lling [2019] 1 LNS 76 where the court dismissed the claim for compensation 
made by the respondent (wife) pursuant to section 10 of the DVA 1994 on the following 
reasons: “… there was no other evidence led to support her allegations. There was also no 
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medical report produced to show that she had suffered depression, anxiety, traumatic stress 
and tension as she alleged (para. 52).” Although section 10 of the DVA 1994 does not state 
medical report as a prerequisite for a successful claim for compensation; however based on the 
above case law, such report is necessary in order to prove the injuries alleged in court to meet 
the standard of proof required by the law which is on the balance of probabilities. Hence, the 
FVDV have to get a medical examination from a doctor for evidence purposes in court as the 
burden of proof lies on them. This could assist the court in considering and granting the claim 
for compensation under section 10 of the DVA 1994. 
It should be noted that the application for compensation in both cases were made by 
non-Muslim FVDV. This is because application for divorce under the LRA 1976 is only 
applicable to non-Muslims. For Muslims, divorce applications are governed by Islamic Family 
Law and thus, such application shall be made to the Shariah Court (Siti Marshita, 2016). 
This raises the very important question of whether Muslim FVDV can apply for 
compensation under section 10 of the DVA 1994 in a civil court. Before any attempt is made 
to answer this, it must be noted that Malaysia has a dual legal system of civil and Shariah laws, 
which are governed by their respective civil and Shariah courts (Siti Zubaidah, 2015). Both 
systems exist parallel to each other, with neither court being subordinate to the other. More 
importantly, in a 1988 constitutional amendment, Article 121 (1A) was inserted providing that 
the civil courts “shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of 
the Shariah Courts.” This provision is crucial in order to ensure clarity in the relationship 
between Shariah and civil courts so as to prevent the civil court from interfering in a matter 
falling within the jurisdiction of Shariah courts (Farid Sufian, 2012). In general, the jurisdiction 
of the Shariah court can be seen in item 1 of List II (State List) in the Ninth Schedule to the 
Federal Constitution, where it states that the Shariah courts have jurisdiction over “Islamic law 
and personal and family law of persons professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic 
law relating to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower …” Thus, 
this shows that matters which relate to marriage involving Muslims fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Shariah courts and should therefore be heard and determined by the Shariah courts. 
Before the DVA 1994 came into effect, a married woman may sue her husband in tort 
under section 9(2) of the Married Women Act 1957 (Act 450) (hereinafter “MWA 1957”). It 
is important to note that before the Act was amended through the Married Women 
(Amendment) Act 1994 which came into force on 8 July 1994, married women could not sue 
their husbands in tort except for the protection or security of her property. However, after the 
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amendment in 1994, particularly with the insertion of section 4A, the scope of suit in tort has 
been extended to cover claims for damages resulting from personal injuries. The Supreme 
Court case of Mohd. Habibullah Mahmood v Faridah bt. Dato Talib [1993] 1 CLJ 264 took 
place before the 1994 amendment to the MWA 1957. In this case, an appeal against the decision 
of the High Court Kuala Lumpur which held that it has jurisdiction to hear the application made 
by the respondent (wife) against the appellant (husband) for damages and injunction for acts of 
assault and battery which occurred during their marriage. Two issues arose in this case which 
required the decision of the Supreme Court as follows: 
 
(i)  whether the High Court Kuala Lumpur has jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s 
application; and 
(ii)  whether the respondent can bring an action in tort against the appellant under 
section 9(2) of the Married Women Act 1957. 
 
Regarding the first issue, the Supreme Court held that Article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution has accorded exclusive jurisdiction to the Shariah courts over personal and family 
Islamic Laws. Tan Sri Dato’ Haji Mohd Azmi bin Dato’ Haji Kamaruddin, one of the three 
Supreme Court Judges, explained that in accordance with section 52(1) (h) (i) of the Islamic 
Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 (Act 303) (hereinafter “IFLA 1984”), a woman 
married in accordance with Shariah law has the right to apply for the dissolution of marriage if 
the husband treats her with cruelty (which may be construed as domestic violence). The case 
fell under the jurisdiction of the Shariah court since the claims for damages and injunction 
related to the marriage and the parties involved were Muslims.  The respondent had also applied 
for dissolution of marriage in Shariah court. By allowing the respondent to subsequently apply 
for damages and injunction in the civil court could be viewed as an abuse of process of the 
court by jumping from one jurisdiction to another over the same subject matter. Moreover, 
section 45(3)(b) of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 confers jurisdiction on 
the Kuala Lumpur Shariah Court to hear cases concerning marriage involving Muslims. This 
consequently means that, in light of Article 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution, the High 
Court Kuala Lumpur is excluded from hearing applications involving the same subject matter 
under section 24 of the Court of Judicature Act 1964. 
Moving on to the second issue, the Supreme Court held that since the action brought 
by the respondent against the appellant in tort was to claim damages for assault and battery as 
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well as an injunction to restrain the appellant from assaulting, harassing and molesting the 
respondent, it did not relate to the protection or security of property. Thus, the respondent could 
not sue the appellant in tort under section 9(2) of the Married Women Ordinance 1957. In other 
words, the claims were not due to the protection of her property, they therefore went beyond 
the scope of section 9(2). 
Based on the abovementioned case, it is unlikely for married Muslim FVDV who 
suffered injuries as a result of domestic violence to claim for compensation to the civil court 
either in accordance with section 10 of the DVA 1994 or under section 4A of the MWA 1957 
on the grounds of Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution. This is particularly where an 
application for dissolution of marriage has already been made in the Shariah court as this would 
lead to the abuse of process of law. 
The next question is whether IFLA 1984 contains provisions that allow married Muslim 
FVDV to claim for compensation as a result of domestic violence. A reading of the IFLA 1984 
indicates that no provision can be found in the Act for compensation due to domestic violence 
(Zaini & Zuliza, 2004). Is it possible then for married Muslim FVDV to apply for compensation 
to the civil court in the absence of such provision in the IFLA 1984? This issue was discussed 
by the Federal Court in Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang dan Seberang Perai v Shaik 
Zolkaffily Shaik Natar & Ors [2003] 3 CLJ 289 where it was held that if a party could not have 
his remedy before the Shariah court, it would not be a reason for him to apply to the civil court, 
but for the state legislature to provide the remedy. It can therefore be inferred from this case 
that the right of married Muslim FVDV to apply for compensation is subject to the availability 
of the provision of compensation in the Islamic Family Laws and the power of the Shariah 
courts to grant it. If they exist, married Muslim FVDV may apply for such compensation. If 
not, then it is proposed for the relevant state legislatures to amend the relevant provisions in 
the Islamic Family Laws to allow married Muslim FVDV who suffered injury or damage to 
property or financial loss as a result of domestic violence to claim for compensation. This will 
ensure that married Muslim FVDV’s interests are better protected financially. 
 
3.2 Compensation in Criminal Proceedings 
Before exploring this matter further, it is important to explain the two common terms used in 
financial penalties i.e. fine and compensation. In general, both are the examples of financial 
penalties that can be imposed by the court in criminal proceedings. However, the notable 
difference between the two is that the former is a payment made to the country, whereas the 
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latter is awarded by the court to the victim. Although the court has the power to issue a 
compensation order, fine is the more common financial penalty imposed on criminal offenders 
compared to compensation (Nasimah, 2011). The rationale is that the fine is usually mentioned 
as an alternative to the sentence of imprisonment as stipulated in the sentencing provision itself. 
Meanwhile, compensation is not incorporated in the sentencing provision as an alternative 
punishment. It is rather a separate and discretionary provision laid down in section 426(1A) of 
the CPC. 
It is important to note that pursuant to section 3 of the DVA 1994, the Act shall be read 
together with the Penal Code or any other written law involving offences relating to domestic 
violence. This provision indicates that committing domestic violence under section 2 (a) to (h) 
of the DVA 1994 per se does not amount to an offence. Domestic violence can only turn into 
an offence if it violates any provision of the Penal Code or any other written law as well. An 
example of this is when a husband abuses his wife and injures her, the husband has committed 
domestic violence under section 2(a) of the DVA 1994 and at the same time, such act is an 
offence under section 323 of the Penal Code and therefore, if there was a police report lodged 
against him, he might be charged with an offence of causing hurt under section 323 of the Penal 
Code. The same section states that upon conviction, the accused may be punishable up to one-
year imprisonment or a fine up to two thousand ringgit or both. Beginning from 31 December 
2014, such offence can be read together with section 326A of the Penal Code that basically 
allows the court to increase the sentence of imprisonment. 
Besides section 323, there are several other sections that can be read with section 326A 
of the Penal Code such as sections 324, 325, 326, 334 and 335 of the Penal Code if they relate 
to domestic violence. Section 326A of the Penal Code was again amended and came into force 
on 1 September 2017. The reason for the amendment was explained by the former Deputy 
Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Datuk Razali Ibrahim when winding up the 
debate in the Dewan Negara. He said that the amendment was aimed at extending the 
application of section 326A of the Penal Code to offences committed against a former spouse, 
child, incapacitated adult or any other member of the family as defined in section 2 of the DVA 
1994 and it is not limited only to those who are still in a legal marriage (Bernama, 2017). At 
present, under section 326A of the Penal Code, a person who causes injury to his former spouse, 
child, incapacitated adult or any other member of the family, if convicted “shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twice of the maximum term for which he 
would have been liable on conviction for that offence under the relevant section 
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notwithstanding any other punishment provided for that offence.” In other words, with the 
amendment, the sentence of imprisonment becomes mandatory on the offender. In light of 
section 326A of the Penal Code, upon conviction, the accused shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to twice of the maximum term for which he would 
have been liable on conviction for that offence under the relevant section. Hence, reading 
section 323 with section 326A of the Penal Code, the accused, if found guilty, shall be 
imprisoned up to two years [1 year (under section 323) x 2 (under section 326A) = 2 years].    
In addition to imprisonment, the court may also impose a fine under section 323 of the Penal 
Code if the court considers it necessary. This principle can be seen in Budiman Che Mamat v 
Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 LNS 1936 where the accused (husband) pleaded guilty to offence 
under section 326 of the Penal Code read together with section 326A of the same Code for 
voluntarily causing grievous hurt to his wife by dangerous weapons. The accused was 
sentenced to 8 years in prison and 1 stroke of whipping. Dissatisfied with the decision passed 
by the trial court, the accused appealed to the High Court in which the latter affirmed the 
sentence. The case shows that in addition to the sentence of imprisonment, the court may also 
impose additional sentences set out in the original charge (section 326) which are fine and 
whipping. It can be inferred that both sections 323 and 326A of the Penal Code only mention 
sentences of imprisonment and fine and do not mention compensation. Having said that, in 
accordance with section 426 (1A) of the CPC, the court may still award compensation to the 
victim. This is because section 326A of the Penal code does not prohibit the court itself from 
granting an order of compensation. 
Based on section 426 (1A) of the CPC, the court may make an order of compensation 
to a victim upon an application made by the Public Prosecutor. But in criminal cases, the 
compensation order can only be made if the Abusive Husbands are found guilty of the offence 
charged. Hence, when the FVDV suffer harm or losses as a result of the crime, then it is 
important for the Public Prosecutor to invoke this particular provision and apply to the court 
for compensation to be awarded to the FVDV. For the sake of clarity, the text is reproduced in 
full as follows: “Without prejudice to subsection (1), the Court before which an accused is 
convicted of an offence shall, upon the application of the Public Prosecutor, make an order 
against the convicted accused for the payment by him, or where the convicted accused is a 
child, by his parent or guardian, of a sum to be fixed by the Court as compensation to a person 
who is the victim of the offence committed by the convicted accused in respect of the injury to 
his person or character, or loss of his income or property, as a result of the offence committed.” 
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Pursuant to section 426 (1B) of the CPC, in cases where the FVDV have died, the order 
of compensation shall be made to their representatives. In determining the amount of 
compensation, the court may take into account the factors specified in paragraphs (a) to (g) of 
subsection (1C) of section 426 of the CPC as follows: “the nature of the offence; the injury 
sustained by the victim; the expenses incurred by the victim; the damage to, or loss of, property 
suffered by the victim; the loss of income incurred by the victim; the ability of the convicted 
accused to pay; and any other factors which the Court deems relevant.” 
It is important to note that, section 426 (1D) of the CPC also allows the court to conduct 
inquiries where appropriate in determining the amount of compensation particularly when it 
involves a high amount of compensation and there is dispute over the amount of compensation 
that should be paid by the offender. This was discussed in the case of Shahrin Ahmad Suffian 
v Public Prosecutor [2015] 1 LNS 206. In this case, the court did not deny that the 
compensation payment order might be made by the court in light of section 426 (1A) of the 
CPC, but the court was of the view that an inquiry should be conducted to consider factors in 
subparagraph (1C), particularly when the amount of compensation payable to the victim is in 
question. 
It follows that in light of section 426 (4) of the CPC, the order for payment shall not 
prejudice any right to a civil remedy for the recovery of any property or for the recovery of 
damages beyond the amount of compensation paid under the order. This indicates that if the 
amount of compensation is not sufficient to compensate for loss or harms suffered, then the 
FVDV at any time may claim compensation through a civil action against the Abusive 
Husbands. 
A thorough reading of section 426 (1A) of the CPC shows some deficiencies within the 
section that may affect the efficiency of the section. Firstly, the court may make a compensation 
order subject to an application made by the Public Prosecutor. Therefore, failure of the Public 
Prosecutor to apply for compensation may deny the opportunity of the FVDV to get 
compensation. Furthermore, section 426 (1A) of the CPC is silent as to the legal consequence 
of non-conformity with the compensation order. Hence, compliance with the order may be 
difficult to be enforced. 
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3.3 Comparison between Compensation in Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
This part seeks to highlight the differences and similarities between compensation in civil and 
criminal proceedings. Generally, there are several differences between compensation in civil 
and criminal proceedings. 
Firstly, the burden to prove that the FVDV have been abused and are therefore entitled 
to compensation is on the FVDV. FVDV have to ensure all relevant evidence is presented to 
the court as proof. On the other hand, in criminal proceedings, the legal burden to present all 
the relevant evidence to prove the accusation lies on the Public Prosecutor, who will conduct 
the case on behalf of the victim. This is the fundamental principle laid down in section 101 of 
the Evidence Act 1950. 
Secondly, in terms of the standard of proof, in civil cases, the FVDV have to prove the 
case on a balance of probabilities. Meanwhile, for criminal cases, the standard of proof required 
is beyond reasonable doubt. Thirdly, compensation through civil proceedings has to be applied 
and pleaded by the FVDV. On the other hand, in criminal proceedings, compensation can only 
be applied once the Abusive Husband is found guilty of the offence and upon the application 
made by the Public Prosecutor. 
With respect to similarities, the decision to grant compensation is made by the court. In 
reaching the decision, the court is guided by a number of criteria that have to be taken into 
consideration.  A reading of section 10 DVA 1994 and section 426 CPC shows that the criteria 
are more or less the same, which include the injury sustained by the victim the expenses 
incurred by the victim, the damage to or loss of property suffered by the victim, the loss of 
income incurred by the victim and other factors which are deemed relevant by the court. 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
The government has its part to play in situations of domestic violence in order to ensure the 
rights of FVDV to seek protection are guarded. The rights shall not only protect FVDV 
physically and mentally, but also financially. The FVDV’s claims for compensation can be 
made either through a civil or criminal proceeding through section 10 of the DVA 1994 and 
section 426 (1A) of the CPC respectively. The compensation serves to make up for loss or harm 
as a result of victimisation. Although in general the FVDV have the right to apply for 
compensation, there are however improvements that can be made to encourage the FVDV to 
claim for compensation. 
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First and foremost, it is proposed to include a provision emphasizing that the application 
for compensation under section 10 of the DVA 1994 may be applied through a stand-alone 
application instead of followed by divorce application. This makes the general public 
particularly FVDV more aware of the fact that the right to compensation arises immediately 
after suffering injury or damage to property or financial loss as a result of domestic violence. 
In this way, it helps the FVDV to recover financially from medical expenses, loss of wages and 
other relevant expenses due to domestic violence without the need to wait for divorce 
application. 
Secondly, it is proposed that the power to make any compensation order under section 
426 (1A) of the CPC should not only depend on the application made by the Public Prosecutor, 
but may also be initiated by the court on its own motion (Wing, 2008) or upon the application 
by the FVDV themselves. It should also be noted that pursuant to section 183A of the CPC, 
before a sentence is passed, the court shall allow a victim to make a statement on the impact 
the offence has had on the victim.  Given the spirit of section 183A of the CPC which allows 
victims to make a statement on the impact of the offence on the victim, it is proposed that 
section 426 (1A) of the CPC be expanded to not only allow the Public Prosecutor to make an 
application for compensation to be paid to victim but also to permit the victim to make such an 
application to court by himself or herself. In this way, the statutory provisions available in the 
criminal justice system will no longer be neglected and can be fully utilised to protect the 
interest of the FVDV. Furthermore, it will ensure that the sentence imposed not only maintains 
the public interest, but is also adequate to respond to the FVDV’s plight and suffering. 
Thirdly, in an effort to encourage the court to grant a compensation order under section 
426 (1A) of the CPC, it is also proposed to impose a responsibility on the court to give reasons 
if the court decides to reject the application for compensation made (Wing, 2008). This will 
place a greater responsibility on the court to carefully examine the application for compensation 
and take account of all relevant factors before making any decision. 
Fourthly, to ensure that the compensation order is respected and complied with, it is 
proposed that a provision to be inserted in section 426 of the CPC to explain the legal 
consequence should the Abusive Husband fail to comply with the compensation order by the 
court. Knowing the legal consequence is important to threaten the offender to adhere strictly 
and not to take the compensation order lightly. One of the legal consequences that may arise in 
case the Abusive Husband fails to comply with the compensation order is that an action of 
contempt of court can be initiated against him. 
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Last but not least, it is important to note that application for compensation before the 
court can be time-consuming and costly. Furthermore, the enforcement of the compensation 
order depends on the Abusive Husband’s ability to pay and therefore will not guarantee that 
the victim will receive the compensation amount. Thus, a state-funded compensation scheme 
should be considered to offer immediate financial aid without going through court process for 
the FVDV’s survival. Although this scheme failed to garner acceptance and due recognition in 
Malaysia in the past (Siti Zubaidah, 2011), many other countries have accepted and established 
the scheme to support FVDV such as the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, United States, 
Canada and Australia. These countries have established non-profit organizations recognized as 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (Siti Zubaidah, 2011). The very first compensation 
scheme funded by the state was initiated by the United Kingdom for crime victims in the year 
1964. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme aimed to indemnify innocent victims of 
violent crimes for the suffering of loss or harm. Subsequently, the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority was sanctioned through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 
to govern a tariff-based compensation scheme in England, Wales, and Scotland (Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority, 2017). Thus, it is worthwhile for the Malaysian government 
to analyse the cost and benefits of such a scheme and seriously reconsider adopting the scheme 
to effectively support FVDV financially. 
In view of the foregoing discussions, the suggestions listed above should be given due 
consideration to ensure that the rights of FVDV to compensation will be better protected.  It is 
hoped that the proposed recommendations will be able to enhance and provide more clarity to 
existing legal framework to strengthen the law in providing compensation in domestic violence 
cases. It will thereby further protect FVDV’s interest financially. 
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